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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
he is returned to prison, he is still subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of
Parole70 and therefore subject to the penalty imposed by section 219.
Although as the dissent points out, the defendant had even been arrested in
Texas by virtue of a New York warrant for violation of his parole and subse-
quently released because no one from the New York Board of Parole appeared
to take him into custody, prior to the commission of the crime in Texas, he should
still be considered to be on parole within the meaning of section 219. A contrary
holding would favor the parolee, who had previously violated his parole in
addition to committing a felony, over the parolee, who had not violated his
parole before committing the same crime.
Surrender Of Prisoner Not Commutation Of Sentence
Surrender by the Governor of'the State of New York of a prisoner to be
tried for a crime in another state does not amount to a commutation of the New
York sentence although the time spent in the other state's prison is deducted from
the New York sentence.
It was so held in People ex rel. Reynolds v. Martin77 concerning a prisoner
who was under sentence of from twenty years to life for second degree murder.
Shortly thereafter, the State of Pennsylvania applied to the Governor of this state
for surrender of the prisoner to be tried for first degree murder. (This surrender
should be within a reasonable time after the commission of the crime and is based
upon reciprocal comity.) 78 The Governor agreed, provided that if the prisoner
was acquitted or received a lesser sentence than the New York sentence, he was
to be returned to New York to finish his term here; but if convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment or execution he was to be left in the custody of the State of
Pennsylvania.
The prisoner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, fifteen years
later the Governor of Pennsylvania commuted the sentence to fifteen years and
one month, also providing for the prisoner's return to New York. Upon his return
to Attica State Prison a writ of habeas corpus was sued out. The writ was dismissed
and upon appeal the dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate Division.79
The Court of Appeals reasoned, in affirming, that the Governor of New
York had not commuted the sentence since this power must be exercised formally
according to the constitution and implementing statutes8 0 Also, the Governor's
76. See note 72 supra.
77. 3 N.Y.2d 217, 165 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1957).
78. People ex rel. Rainone v. Murphy, 1 N.Y.2d 367, 153 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1956).
79. 2 A.D.2d 646, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 626 (4th Dep't 1956).
80. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, §4; N.Y. CODE CRIm. PRoc. §§692-697.
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terms were construed to insure that the prisoner received at least the equal of
his New York sentence before the agreement was fulfilled. However, the Court
agreed the prisoner was entitled to have the time spent in the Pennsylvania prison
credited against his New York sentence.
Thus, New York has insured against another state's indiscriminate release
preventing vindication of New York Law.
Per Curiam
Right To Appeal - In People v. Kalan,81 the Court of Appeals held, per
curiam, that when a defendant is penniless and unable to employ counsel or pay
for a transcript of the trial minutes, and further when he is in prison and physically
unable to inspect such trial minutes filed in Clerk's office, the refusal to assign
counsel upon his request effectively deprives him of his use of the right to appeal.
Coram Nobis - In People v. Farina,8 2 the Court set aside a conviction on
grounds that not only had the defendant not received the sentence promised him
by the trial court to induce a plea of guilt, but that he had actually been coerced
by the judge into entering the plea.
DECEDENT'S ESTATES
Improper Delegafion Of Judicial Aufhorify-Waiver
The Court in, In Re Nowakowski's Estate,' determined that there was a
basis for the Surrogate's finding that the appellant was not fraudulently induced
into waiving and releasing his right of election against his wife's will.2 Another
problem with which the Court was faced was the properiety of the Surrogate's
clerk taking and reporting testimony, that is, whether this was an improper dele-
gation of judicial authority.a On this point the majority felt it was not necessary
to reach a conclusion for it found that the appellant waived any right to a par-
ticular mode of trial by participating in the proceedings before the clerk without
raising any objection. In fact there was no objection until rehearing before the
Appellate Division. The dissenter was of the opinion that before you can find
a waiver there must be a finding of a right subject to be waived. Accordingly
he found that the clerk exceeded his powers which are limited by section 32
of the Surrogate Court Act.
81. 2 N.Y.2d 278, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1957).
82. 2 N.Y.2d 454, 161 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1957).
1. 2 N.Y.2d 618, 162 N.Y.S.2d 19, (1957).
2. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §18(1) provides for spouse's right of election
against the will and §18(9) provides for waiver and release of this right.
3. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, §13; N.Y. SURROGATE'S CouRT ACT §32(10).
